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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiff Connie Edmonson was a beneficiary of a life 
insurance plan established by her employer and governed by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA). Defendant Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. 
chose to pay her benefits using a retained asset account, 
which allowed it to hold onto the benefits and invest them for 
its own profit until Edmonson affirmatively chose to 
withdraw them from the account. 
 
 Edmonson claims Lincoln breached its fiduciary duty 
of loyalty under ERISA and seeks disgorgement of the profit 
Lincoln earned by investing the benefits owed to her. The 
District Court granted summary judgment in Lincoln’s favor, 
concluding Lincoln was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when it took the actions subject to complaint. We will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
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Connie Edmonson’s husband was insured under a 
group life insurance policy issued by Lincoln. The policy was 
established under an ERISA employee benefit plan sponsored 
by Edmonson’s employer, Schurz Communications. When 
her husband died, Edmonson was entitled to $10,000 in 
benefits. The policy states, “[u]pon receipt of satisfactory 
proof of a Dependent’s death while insured under this Policy, 
the Company will pay the amount of the Dependents [sic] 
Life Insurance in effect on the date of such death,” and that 
“[a]ny benefits payable under this Policy will be paid 
immediately after the Company receives complete proof of 
claim.” The policy does not state that Lincoln will pay the 
benefits using a retained asset account and does not otherwise 
specify how Lincoln was to pay Edmonson the benefits. 
 
 Edmonson submitted a claim form to Lincoln for 
payment. The form stated that when the benefits are greater 
than $5,000, Lincoln’s usual method of payment is to open a 
SecureLine Account in the beneficiary’s name. After Lincoln 
approved Edmonson’s claim, it set up a SecureLine Account 
in her name in the amount of $10,000, and sent her a 
checkbook from which she could draw checks on the account. 
Lincoln explained to Edmonson that she would receive 
interest on the account in the amount of the Bloomberg 
national average rate for interest-bearing checking accounts 
plus 1%. Lincoln also explained that if Edmonson wanted the 
entire proceeds immediately, all she had to do was write one 
check for the entire balance. 
 
 The SecureLine Account was a retained asset account. 
When distributing benefits using retained asset accounts, an 
insurance company does not deposit any funds into the 
account. Rather, it merely credits the account with the 
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benefits, and when a beneficiary writes a check on the 
account, the insurance company transfers funds into the 
account to cover the check. Until that time, the insurance 
company retains the money owed to the beneficiary (the 
“retained assets”), and can invest the retained assets for its 
own profit. 
 
 Three months after Lincoln set up the SecureLine 
Account, Edmonson withdrew the full amount of the 
insurance proceeds. Lincoln wrote her a check for $52.33 of 
interest. Edmonson contends that the profit Lincoln earned 
from investing the retained assets was greater than the amount 
of interest paid to her, and that Lincoln made approximately 
$5 million in profit in 2009 by investing retained assets 
credited to her account and the accounts of other 
beneficiaries. 
 
Edmonson brought an ERISA claim contending 
Lincoln violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA by 
choosing to pay her using a retained asset account and by 
investing the retained assets for its own profit. She contends 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties were implicated because both acts 
involved exercising “discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management” or “administration” of an 
ERISA plan and exercising “authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of [plan] assets.” 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A) (setting forth the various functions that trigger 
ERISA fiduciary duties). She argues Lincoln’s acts breached 
its fiduciary duties because these actions were not taken for 
her exclusive benefit and because they involved self-dealing. 
See id. § 1104(a)(1) (“[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries and . . . for the exclusive purpose of . . . 
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providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”); 
id. § 1106(b)(1) (“A fiduciary with respect to a plan shall not 
. . . deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for 
his own account.”). Edmonson seeks disgorgement of the 
profits earned by Lincoln from the investment of the retained 
assets under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which allows a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to obtain equitable relief 
to redress violations of ERISA. 
 
Lincoln moved to dismiss, arguing Edmonson lacked 
both constitutional and statutory standing to bring her claim. 
It also argued it was not acting as a fiduciary under ERISA 
when it took the actions subject to complaint and, even if it 
were, it did not breach any fiduciary duty by taking these 
actions.  See Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 777 F. 
Supp. 2d 869, 876 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The trial court rejected all 
of Lincoln’s arguments. Id. at 874. The court first concluded 
Edmonson had standing under Article III because she 
suffered an injury-in-fact based on the amount of the spread 
between the interest Lincoln paid to her and the profit it 
earned by investing the retained assets. Id. at 881. The court 
then concluded Edmonson had statutory standing under 
ERISA, rejecting Lincoln’s argument that Edmonson was no 
longer a “beneficiary” of an ERISA plan once the SecureLine 
Account was closed. Id. at 883. Finally, the court concluded 
Edmonson had sufficiently alleged that Lincoln breached its 
fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. at 892. 
 
Following discovery, Lincoln moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that it was not a fiduciary under 
ERISA when it took the contested actions. Edmonson moved 
for partial summary judgment on the same issue. Edmonson 
also moved to certify a class of individuals who were paid 
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ERISA benefits by Lincoln via a retained asset account. The 
court granted Lincoln’s motion for summary judgment, 
denied Edmonson’s motion for partial summary judgment, 
and dismissed as moot Edmonson’s motion for class 
certification. Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 899 F. 
Supp. 2d 310, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The court concluded 
Lincoln’s actions were not governed by ERISA fiduciary 
duties because the acts did not involve the administration or 
management of the plan and did not involve exercising 
authority or control over plan assets. Edmonson appeals, 
contending the court erred with respect to both conclusions.
1
  
 
II. ERISA’s Fiduciary Principles 
“‘ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to 
promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in 
employee benefit plans.’” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 
498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)). To protect participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, ERISA 
“‘establish[es] standards of conduct, responsibility, and 
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans.’” Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987) (quoting 29 
U.S.C. § 1001(b)). ERISA defines the circumstances under 
which a person or entity is a fiduciary, sets forth the duties of 
these fiduciaries, and provides various causes of action 
designed to promote the enforcement of these duties. 
 
 Under ERISA,  
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to 
the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting 
management of such plan or exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or 
disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders 
investment advice for a fee or other 
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to 
any moneys or other property of such plan, or 
has any authority or responsibility to do so, or 
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or 
discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan.  
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). “‘ERISA  . . . defines ‘fiduciary’ 
not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional terms of 
control and authority over the plan.’” In re Unisys Corp. 
Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 579 F.3d 220, 228 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting 
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993)). 
“Accordingly, ‘[f]iduciary duties under ERISA attach not just 
to particular persons, but to particular persons performing 
particular functions.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1158 (3d 
Cir. 1990)). The definition of a fiduciary under ERISA is to 
be broadly construed. Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. 
Co., 33 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Smith v. Hartford 
Ins. Grp., 6 F.3d 131, 141 n.13 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 
 Among other duties, ERISA requires that a fiduciary  
“discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the 
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants 
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and their beneficiaries.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). ERISA 
further requires that “[a] fiduciary with respect to a plan shall 
not . . . deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or 
for his own account.” Id. § 1106(b). At least in one respect, 
these duties can be characterized as a fiduciary’s duty of 
loyalty. 
 
 Edmonson contends Lincoln was acting as a fiduciary 
both when it chose to pay her using a retained asset account 
and when it later invested the retained assets for its own 
profit. She argues both acts were constrained by fiduciary 
duties because the acts involved the management or 
administration of the plan, or alternatively, because the acts 
involved exercising authority or control over plan assets. 
Lincoln argues that it was no longer acting as an ERISA 
fiduciary when it took the challenged acts and, alternatively, 
that these acts did not breach its duty of loyalty.  
 
 ERISA provides for private enforcement of its duties 
by creating causes of action available to participants, 
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. Edmonson brings her 
disgorgement claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which 
allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a cause 
of action “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any 
provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations 
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [ERISA] or the terms of 
the plan.” The Supreme Court has described §1132(a)(3) as a 
“catchall” provision which “act[s] as a safety net, offering 
appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations 
that § [1132] does not elsewhere adequately remedy.” Varity 
10 
 
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (quotation 
omitted).
2
   
 
III. Standing 
On appeal, amicus American Council of Life Insurers 
argues Edmonson lacks standing to bring her claim because 
she suffered no injury-in-fact, as she received all the benefits 
owed to her under the policy, plus interest. The District Court 
rejected this argument, concluding Lincoln’s failure to pay 
Edmonson the full amount of the profit it earned from 
investing the retained assets constituted for standing purposes 
an injury-in-fact. The court concluded Edmonson’s injury 
was the “spread” between the interest Lincoln earned by 
investing the retained assets and the interest it paid to her. 
Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 881. The court rejected 
Lincoln’s argument that Edmonson suffered no injury merely 
because she received all she was entitled to under the plan 
and policy. See id.  
 
Although Lincoln did not appeal this ruling, “federal 
courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do 
not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they 
must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties 
                                                 
2
 Based on the language of § 1132, “[t]he Supreme Court has 
reasoned that ‘[e]quitable relief must mean something less 
than all relief,’ and therefore it has explained that § 
1132(a)(3) authorizes only ‘those categories of relief that 
were typically available in equity,’” i.e., not claims available 
at law. Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 539 F.3d 292, 
306 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002)). 
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either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. 
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
 
We 
review the legal conclusions related to standing de novo, “but 
review for clear error the factual elements underlying the 
District Court’s determination of standing.” Gen. Instrument 
Corp. v. Nu-Tek Elecs. & Mfg., 197 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 
1999).
 
 
 
 Article III of the United States Constitution “limits the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). 
“Courts enforce the case-or-controversy requirement through 
the several justiciability doctrines that ‘cluster about Article 
III.’” Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 
137 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750 (1984)). These doctrines “include standing, ripeness, 
mootness, the political-question doctrine, and the prohibition 
on advisory opinions.” Id. Standing is “perhaps the most 
important of these doctrines.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. 
 
“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. First, the 
plaintiff must suffer an injury-in-fact that is concrete and 
particularized and actual or imminent, as opposed to 
conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Second, “there must be a 
causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result 
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the 
court.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). “Third, it 
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 
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injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. 
(quotation omitted). 
 
We begin with the first requirement, injury-in-fact. 
Generally, disgorgement claims for breach of fiduciary duty 
do not require that a plaintiff suffer a financial loss, as relief 
in a disgorgement claim “is measured by the defendant’s 
profits.” Restatement (Third) on Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment § 51 cmt. a (2011); see also id. § 43 cmt. d 
(stating a claim based on a breach of the duty of loyalty may 
be brought “without regard to economic injury”); id. 
(providing examples where fiduciary is liable for gains even 
though plaintiff suffered no loss). This is because 
disgorgement claims seek not to compensate for a loss, but to 
“deprive[] wrongdoers of ill-gotten gains.” Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exchange Corp., 991 
F.2d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). See S.E.C. v. 
Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[D]isgorgement 
is . . . an equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer 
from enriching himself by his wrongs . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).
3 
A requirement of a net financial loss would allow 
                                                 
3
 In contrast, a claim for restitution seeks to compensate a 
plaintiff for a loss, so a financial loss is required to bring such 
a claim. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has 
explained, “disgorgement is not precisely restitution. 
Disgorgement wrests ill-gotten gains from the hands of a 
wrongdoer. It is an equitable remedy meant to prevent the 
wrongdoer from enriching himself by his wrongs. 
Disgorgement does not aim to compensate the victims of the 
wrongful acts, as restitution does.” Huffman, 996 F.2d at 802 
(citations omitted). 
 
13 
 
fiduciaries to retain ill-gotten profit—exactly what 
disgorgement claims are designed to prevent—so long as the 
breaches of fiduciary duty do not harm the plan or 
beneficiaries. Accordingly, the nature of disgorgement claims 
suggest that a financial loss is not required for standing, as a 
loss is not an element of a disgorgement claim. 
 
The principles of ERISA provide further support for 
this conclusion. ERISA’s duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary 
from profiting even if no loss to the plan occurs. Under 29 
U.S.C. § 1109(a), ERISA provides that plans can recover that 
profit whether or not the plan suffered a financial loss. See 
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 122 (7th Cir. 1984) (“ERISA 
clearly contemplates actions against fiduciaries who profit by 
using trust assets, even where the plan beneficiaries do not 
suffer direct financial loss.”).4 “The purpose behind this rule 
is to deter the fiduciary from engaging in disloyal conduct by 
denying him the profits of his breach.” Amalgamated 
Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 
                                                 
4
 Nothing in the text of ERISA suggests a beneficiary must 
suffer a financial loss in order to bring a suit against a 
fiduciary for breach of the duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty 
is unqualified, as ERISA provides that a fiduciary “shall . . . 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and . . . for the 
exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants 
and their beneficiaries” and that the fiduciary “shall not . . . 
deal with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his 
own account.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1106(b) (emphases 
added). 
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1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing G. Bogert and G. Bogert, 
The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543, at 218 (2d ed. 1978)).
5
  
 
Notwithstanding these principles, the amicus contends 
our decision in Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 
333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003), requires a plaintiff to show a 
financial loss in order to have standing to bring a 
disgorgement claim. The plaintiff’s claim in Horvath was that 
her HMO failed to disclose details of cost-control incentives 
offered to participating physicians, and thus violated ERISA’s 
duty to make full disclosures. She sued for restitution, 
disgorgement, and an injunction barring the defendant from 
omitting information regarding physician incentives from its 
disclosures to plan members. Id. at 455. We first concluded 
the plaintiff did not need to “demonstrate actual harm in order 
to have standing to seek injunctive relief.” Id. at 456. But 
because her claims for restitution and disgorgement sought 
monetary relief for herself, as opposed to the plan, we 
concluded those claims “are individual in nature and therefore 
                                                 
5
 These principles are consistent with the law of trusts, which 
“often will inform, but will not necessarily determine the 
outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary duties.” 
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 497. A financial loss is not a 
requirement for a disgorgement claim under trust law. See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 100 cmt. c (explaining a 
trustee “is liable for any profit he has made through his 
breach of trust even though the trust has suffered no loss”); 
see also Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 846 (7th Cir. 
2012) (holding a plaintiff had standing to bring a state law 
disgorgement claim even though her ultimate distributions 
were not diminished by the breach of fiduciary duty).   
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require her to demonstrate individual loss.” Id. (citing In re 
Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
She acknowledged, however, she had suffered no direct 
financial loss and conceded “that the care and coverage she 
received as a member of the [HMO] was never affected by 
the existence of physician incentives.” Id. Instead, she 
contended her injury was that her firm overpaid for the 
healthcare she received and that, absent the breach, the firm 
would have passed any savings on to her. Id. We rejected this 
“diminished value” theory of injury as a means to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement. Id. at 456-57. We also concluded 
the plaintiff’s theory was “far too speculative to serve as the 
basis for a claim of individual loss” because it rested “not 
only on the troublesome assumption that a factfinder can 
accurately determine the amount [the plaintiff’s] firm 
allegedly overpaid [the HMO], but also on the notion that the 
firm would have passed these savings on to its employees in 
the form of a higher salary or additional benefits.” Id. at 457. 
 
Our decision in Horvath did not revolve around 
whether the plaintiff suffered a financial loss. The Horvath 
plaintiff never contended she suffered a financial loss, as her 
employer paid all the premiums to the HMO and did not 
make any deductions from employee paychecks. Id. at 452. 
Despite this fact and her concession that she received all she 
was entitled to under the plan, we went on to determine 
whether she nevertheless had demonstrated an individual loss. 
Accordingly, we doubt Horvath should be read to require a 
financial loss. Nothing in Horvath, beyond any possible 
connotation of the word “loss,” states or implies that a net 
financial loss is required for standing to bring a disgorgement 
claim. Accordingly, we disagree with the amicus’ contention 
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that Horvath requires a financial loss for standing to bring a 
disgorgement claim. 
 
Rather, the question in Horvath was whether the 
plaintiff could bring individual claims for restitution and 
disgorgement or whether any relief had to be sought by the 
plan.
6
 She contended that her firm overpaid for the healthcare 
she received due to the defendant’s breach. But because she 
sought relief for herself individually, we stated she must show 
an individual right to recover those overpayments. She 
attempted to do by arguing that she would have received 
more benefits or a higher salary absent the breach, but she 
failed to make this showing. Any injury, and thus any right to 
relief, accrued only to the plan, not to the individual plan 
members. Accordingly, we believe Horvath holds that a 
plaintiff must show she has an individual right to the 
                                                 
6
 Notably, for the proposition that an “individual loss” is 
required, the Horvath court cited to In re Unisys Savings Plan 
Litigation, 173 F.3d at 159, which in turn cited to Varity 
Corp., 516 U.S. at 507-15. These cases neither discuss the 
requirements for a disgorgement claim nor provide any 
support for an argument that a financial loss is required for 
standing to bring a disgorgement claim. Rather, like Horvath, 
both of these cases focus on the difference between a claim 
brought by an individual and a claim brought on behalf of the 
plan. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 507-15 (comparing causes 
of action under ERISA available to plans and individuals); In 
re Unisys, 173 F.3d at 159 (concluding the plaintiff’s claim 
failed because his expert “referred only to those losses 
incurred by the Fund and not to any losses incurred by 
individual participants named as plaintiffs”). 
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defendant’s profit and that when a plan has the right to the 
profit, the individual plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional 
injury.   
 
Therefore, we conclude a financial loss is not a 
prerequisite for standing to bring a disgorgement claim under 
ERISA. As discussed, such a rule would be contrary to the 
nature of a disgorgement claim, principles of trust law, and 
principles of ERISA. Edmonson is seeking recovery based on 
Lincoln’s use of assets that belonged to her. Unlike in 
Horvath, any right to recover belongs to her, not to the plan, 
and there has been no suggestion to the contrary. 
Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that, for 
standing purposes, Edmonson incurred an injury-in-fact 
because she “suffered an individual loss, measured as the 
‘spread’ or difference” between the profit Lincoln earned by 
investing the retained assets and the interest it paid to her. 
Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 881; see also Vander Luitgaren 
v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Canada, No. 09-11410, 2010 WL 
4722269, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 18, 2010) (rejecting argument 
that plaintiff lacked standing to sue for disgorgement of profit 
earned via a retained asset account). But see Faber v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., No. 08-10588, 2009 WL 3415369, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009) (reaching opposite conclusion).
7
  
                                                 
7
 Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court in Faber, 648 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 
2011), the issue regarding standing for disgorgement claims 
was not addressed on appeal. The Second Circuit only 
discussed whether the plaintiff had constitutional standing to 
seek injunctive relief, id. at 103, and explicitly declined to 
reach the question of whether the plaintiff had standing to 
seek disgorgement, id. (“[O]ur merits analysis does not 
18 
 
Finally, the amount of the alleged injury, Lincoln’s 
profit, is not hypothetical or speculative. There is evidence of 
how much profit Lincoln earned by making investments with 
its general asset pool, in which the retained assets were held. 
It is a question of mathematics to determine how much of 
Lincoln’s profit was the result of its investment of 
Edmonson’s $10,000. Importantly, Edmonson’s claim is not 
that, had Lincoln not set up the SecureLine Account, she 
would have invested the retained assets on her own. 
Accordingly, it does not matter that there is no evidence of 
how she would have used the benefits had they not been 
retained by Lincoln.  
 
To summarize, an ERISA beneficiary suffers an 
injury-in-fact sufficient to bring a disgorgement claim when a 
defendant allegedly breaches its fiduciary duty, profits from 
the breach, and the beneficiary, as opposed to the plan, has an 
individual right to the profit.
8
 As Edmonson has met these 
requirements, we conclude that for standing purposes she 
suffered an injury-in-fact.. 
 
                                                                                                             
depend on whether Faber also has standing to seek 
disgorgement . . . . In light of our ultimate conclusion that the 
complaint fails to state a claim, we are not required to answer 
th[is] question[].”).  
 
8
 As Horvarth demonstrates, not every breach of duty will 
cause beneficiaries to suffer an injury-in-fact sufficient to 
bring a disgorgement claim. In cases like Horvath, when the 
right to a defendant’s profit belongs to the plan, a beneficiary 
has not suffered a constitutional injury. 
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The second requirement of Article III standing, 
causation, requires that “the alleged injury-in-fact is causally 
connected and traceable to an action of the defendant[].” The 
Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2000); see 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. We have described this requirement 
as akin to “but for” causation and found the traceability 
requirement met even where the conduct in question might 
not have been a proximate cause of the harm, due to 
intervening events. The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 360-61 
(finding traceability requirement met where regulation was 
cause-in-fact of newspaper’s lost revenue when third parties 
stopped buying advertisements because of the regulatory 
action). Lincoln’s acts of selecting the method of payment 
and then investing the retained assets allowed Lincoln to 
profit. Edmonson could have prevented Lincoln from 
profiting after it set up the SecureLine Account by 
immediately withdrawing all of her benefits. Nevertheless, we 
conclude Edmonson’s injury—Lincoln’s decision to keep the 
profit for itself—is “fairly traceable” to its initial decision to 
pay her via the retained asset account. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. 
 
The final element of constitutional standing is 
redressability, which requires that “it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 
(quotation omitted). Edmonson contends she is entitled to 
Lincoln’s profit via disgorgement.9 Therefore, we conclude 
                                                 
9
 For standing purposes, we assume without deciding that 
Edmonson is correct that ERISA’s disgorgement remedy 
would entitle her to Lincoln’s profit even though it complied 
with its contractual requirement to pay her interest at an 
agreed-upon rate. 
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Edmonson has standing under Article III to bring her 
disgorgement claim against Lincoln for allegedly breaching 
its fiduciary duty of loyalty.  
 
IV. Statutory Standing 
In addition to having Article III standing, an ERISA 
plaintiff must also have statutory standing. Graden v. 
Conexant Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). 
“Statutory standing is simply statutory interpretation,” and we 
ask whether the remedies provided for in ERISA allow the 
particular plaintiff to bring the particular claim. Id. As 
discussed, Edmonson seeks disgorgement under § 1132(a)(3), 
which only provides for “appropriate equitable relief.” 
 
Lincoln argues that not all disgorgement is necessarily 
equitable in nature, relying on Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). In Great-West Life, the 
Court held that relief under § 1132(a)(3) is only available 
when a plaintiff seeks equitable restitution, as opposed to 
restitution available only at law. The Court explained that 
“not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is 
available in equity. In the days of the divided bench, 
restitution was available in certain cases at law, and in certain 
others at equity.” Id. at 212. For example, when a “plaintiff 
could not assert title or right to possession of particular 
property, but . . . nevertheless might be able to show just 
grounds for recovering money . . . the plaintiff had a right to 
restitution at law.” Id. at 213 (quotation omitted). “In 
contrast, a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily 
in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where 
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money or property identified as belonging in good conscience 
to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or 
property in the defendant’s possession.” Id. The Court further 
explained that “for restitution to lie in equity, the action 
generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the 
defendant,” as a claim for breach of contract does. Id. at 214. 
Rather, restitution lies in equity when the relief seeks “to 
restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the 
defendant’s possession.” Id. at 214.10  
 
 The Court noted, however, that “an accounting for 
profits, a form of equitable restitution,” is a “limited 
exception” to its rule defining the nature of equitable 
remedies. Id. at 214 n.2. “If, for example, a plaintiff is entitled 
to a constructive trust on particular property held by the 
defendant, he may also recover profits produced by the 
defendant’s use of that property, even if he cannot identify a 
particular res containing the profits sought to be recovered.” 
Id. The relief sought by Edmonson falls within this exception 
to the general principles established in Great-West Life, as 
disgorgement and accounting for profits are essentially the 
same remedy. See Restatement (Third) on Restitution and 
                                                 
10
 When we distinguished restitution from disgorgement 
above, we were using the term restitution to refer to a 
particular remedy. Restitution, however, can also be used 
more generally “as a metonym for the class of remedies 
particularly identified” with unjust enrichment. See F.T.C. v. 
Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 370 (2d Cir. 2011). 
The Court in Great-West Life was using the term in the latter 
sense and, accordingly, its analysis applies to claims for 
disgorgement. 
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Unjust Enrichment § 51(4); id. cmt. a (“Restitution measured 
by the defendant’s wrongful gain is frequently called 
‘disgorgement.’ Other cases refer to an ‘accounting’ or an 
‘accounting for profit.’”); see also Great-West Life, 534 U.S. 
at 217 (instructing courts to look to the Restatements for 
guidance). The disgorgement remedy is equitable even 
though Lincoln no longer has possession of the retained 
assets, making a claim for a constructive trust unnecessary. 
See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 213 
(3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that a claim to recover interest 
earned on illegally retained benefits is equitable under Great-
West Life even though the defendant had voluntarily paid the 
benefits over to the plaintiff, meaning that no constructive 
trust over the benefits was required). Accordingly, we 
conclude Edmonson’s claim for disgorgement, which is akin 
to an accounting for profits, is an equitable remedy available 
under ERISA and Great-West Life.
11
 
 
V. Merits 
                                                 
11
 The dissent concludes Edmonson lacks statutory standing 
because she cannot demonstrate she would be entitled to a 
constructive trust over the retained assets, as the dissent 
contends Edmonson had legal title over the assets (we 
question whether Edmonson had legal title over $10,000 that 
had not been segregated from Lincoln’s general asset pool 
and over which Lincoln had complete control). More 
importantly, whether Edmonson could have asserted a 
constructive trust over the retained assets goes to the merits of 
her claim, not to statutory standing. 
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We now turn to the merits of Edmonson’s claim that 
Lincoln breached its ERISA duty of loyalty. The trial court 
concluded Lincoln was not acting as a fiduciary when it took 
the actions subject to complaint and granted Lincoln’s motion 
for summary judgment.
12
  
 
To recapitulate, Edmonson contends Lincoln violated 
ERISA when it selected the SecureLine Account as the 
method of payment and again when it invested the retained 
assets for its own profit. She argues both of these acts 
triggered ERISA fiduciary duties because they involved the 
management or administration of the plan, or alternatively, an 
exercise of authority or control over plan assets. Lincoln 
acted as a fiduciary if either of the two challenged actions 
involved either type of conduct. 
 
Whether the use of retained asset accounts runs afoul 
of ERISA is a question of first impression in this circuit. Two 
of our sister circuits have considered this question, but have 
come to different conclusions. See Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 648 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding the use of a 
retained asset account did not violate ERISA when the 
insurance policy provided for it); Mogel v. UNUM Life Ins. 
Co., 547 F.3d 23, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2008) (concluding the use of 
a retained asset account did violate ERISA when the 
insurance policy required a lump sum payment). The parties 
                                                 
12
 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 
de novo, applying the same standard the district court 
applied.” Viera v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 413 
(3d Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when there 
is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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rely heavily on these two cases, so we will begin with a 
synopsis of them. But there is a key factual distinction 
between these cases and our case: the plan and policy in our 
case are silent as to how Lincoln is to pay Edmonson. 
 
In Mogel, the policies at issue provided that “‘all 
benefits payable . . . will be paid as soon as the Insurance 
Company receives proof of claim acceptable to it’ and 
‘[u]nless otherwise elected, payment for loss of life will be 
made in one lump sum.’” 547 F.3d at 25 (alterations in 
original). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the 
plaintiffs had alleged a breach of fiduciary duties because 
payment via a retained asset account did not satisfy the 
requirement that payment be made in a lump sum. Id. at 26-
27. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
selection of the retained asset account method of payment 
occurred after it had fulfilled its fiduciary duties, which the 
defendant apparently contended involved merely processing 
and approving the claim. Id. at 26. The court stated that the 
defendant’s contention “rests on quicksand,” because “it 
obscures reality” to argue the plaintiffs had received the 
required lump sum payment when the defendant set up the 
retained asset account. Id. The court concluded the defendant 
had not “completed its fiduciary functions under the plan,” 
and thus the plaintiffs had alleged a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Id.  
 
In Faber, the plan documents for one of the policies at 
issue stated, “[p]ayment of a death benefit of $7,500 or more 
is made under MetLife’s Total Control Account [i.e., a 
retained asset account]. The death benefit amount is deposited 
in an interest bearing money market account and your 
beneficiary is provided with a checkbook to use for writing 
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checks to withdraw funds.” 648 F.3d at 100-01. The plan 
documents for the other policies at issue similarly provided, 
“[i]f the benefit from a single claim is $6,000, or more, your 
beneficiary may receive basic life insurance benefits under 
one of the several options available under the Beneficiary’s 
Total Control Account (TCA) Program.” Id. at 101. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the insurance 
company did not violate ERISA when paying the benefits via 
a retained asset account, in part because the plan documents 
expressly allowed it to do so.  Id. at 107. The court concluded  
 
MetLife discharged its fiduciary obligations as a 
claims administrator and ceased to be an ERISA 
fiduciary when, in accordance with the Plans, it 
created Plaintiffs’ [retained asset accounts], 
credited them with the amount of benefits due, 
and issued checkbooks enabling Plaintiffs to 
withdraw their proceeds at any time. Thus, 
MetLife was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when it invested the funds backing Plaintiffs’ 
[retained asset accounts].  
 
Id. at 104. The court then determined that the retained assets 
were not plan assets, because the plan had no ownership 
interest in them at the time defendant invested them. Id. at 
106. Accordingly, the defendant was not acting in a fiduciary 
capacity when it invested the retained assets, and plaintiffs’ 
ERISA claim failed.  
 
A. Selection of the Method of Payment 
Edmonson argues Lincoln breached its fiduciary duty 
when it selected the SecureLine Account as the method of 
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paying her benefits. She argues Lincoln was acting as a 
fiduciary when it took this action because this act involved 
the management or administration of the plan or, 
alternatively, because this act involved exercising authority or 
control over plan assets. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). We 
hold that Lincoln was acting as a fiduciary when it chose to 
pay her via the SecureLine Account and, to this extent, we 
depart from the thoughtful analysis of the trial court. We 
conclude, however, as we later explain, that Lincoln did not 
breach its fiduciary duty when it selected this form of 
payment. 
 
1. 
Edmonson contends that the selection of the 
SecureLine Account as the method of payment triggered 
ERISA fiduciary duties because it involved the 
“management” or “administration” of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 
1002(21)(A) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan 
to the extent . . . he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such plan or . 
. . has any discretionary authority or discretionary 
responsibility in the administration of such plan . . . .”). Only 
discretionary acts of plan administration or management 
trigger fiduciary duties. “Since discretionary authority, 
responsibility or control is a prerequisite to fiduciary status, it 
follows that persons who perform purely ministerial tasks, 
such as claims processing and calculation, cannot be 
fiduciaries because they do not have discretionary roles.” 
Confer v. Custom Eng’g Co., 952 F.2d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Accordingly, when a plan or policy requires the performance 
of an act of plan management or administration in a specific 
manner, then ERISA’s fiduciary duties are not implicated. 
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But when the plan or policy permits some leeway in how an 
act is performed, then the discretionary choice on how to 
perform that act is cabined by ERISA’s fiduciary duties. 
 
 To define the terms “management” and 
“administration” of a plan under ERISA, we “look to the 
common law, which, over the years, has given to terms such 
as ‘fiduciary’ and trust ‘administration’ a legal meaning to 
which, we normally presume, Congress meant to refer.” 
Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502. “The ordinary trust law 
understanding of fiduciary ‘administration’ of a trust is that to 
act as an administrator is to perform the duties imposed, or 
exercise the powers conferred, by the trust documents.” Id. 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 164 (1957)). “At 
common law, fiduciary duties characteristically attach to 
decisions about managing assets and distributing property to 
beneficiaries.” Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231 
(2000). 
 
Although Lincoln initially contended the selection of 
the method of payment was neither discretionary nor an act of 
plan administration or management, it conceded at oral 
argument that this act was governed by ERISA’s fiduciary 
duties.
13
 Lincoln had the choice whether to pay Edmonson 
with the SecureLine Account or with some other form of 
payment. This is the definition of discretion. Cf. Faber, 648 
F.3d at 104-05 (emphasizing that the plan at issue provided 
for the insurance company to pay the benefits using a retained 
asset account). The choice of how to pay Edmonson also 
                                                 
13
 The able District Court did not have the benefit of this 
concession when ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment. 
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stands in clear contrast with those activities the Department of 
Labor has given as examples of ministerial acts. See 29 
C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (listing, for example, the application of 
rules determining eligibility for participation or benefits, 
calculation of services and compensation credits for benefits, 
preparation of employee communications material, 
calculation of benefits, advising participants of their rights, 
collection of contributions, and processing of claims). 
 
Lincoln’s selection of the method of payment was an 
act of plan administration or management. Lincoln’s 
“disposition to the beneficiaries of benefits under the plan 
falls comfortably within the scope of ERISA’s definition of 
fiduciary duties with respect to plan administration.” Mogel, 
547 F.3d at 27 (citing Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 502); see 
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231 (“At common law, fiduciary duties 
characteristically attach to decisions about managing assets 
and distributing property to beneficiaries.”). Accordingly, 
Lincoln’s decision to pay Edmonson via the SecureLine 
Account constituted a discretionary act of plan management 
or administration, and Lincoln was subject to ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties when it performed this act.  
 
Lincoln’s selection of the method of payment also 
involved exercising authority or control over plan assets, and 
triggered fiduciary duties for this independent and alternative 
reason. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (“[A] person is a 
fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent . . . [he] exercises 
any authority or control respecting management or disposition 
of its assets . . . .”). It is undisputed that the policy is a plan 
asset. Under ERISA’s guaranteed benefit exemption 
provision, when “a plan to which a guaranteed benefit policy 
is issued by an insurer,” as here, “the assets of such plan shall 
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be deemed to include such policy.” Id. § 1101(b)(2). Lincoln 
exercised authority and control over the policy when it 
selected the method of payment because Lincoln had 
discretion to determine the type of payment. Therefore, we 
conclude Lincoln acted as a fiduciary when it chose to pay 
Edmonson using the SecureLine Account for the alternative 
reason that this action involved exercising authority and 
control over plan assets.  
 
2. 
We now address whether the selection of the 
SecureLine Account as the method of payment was a breach 
of Lincoln’s fiduciary duty. Edmonson contends the selection 
of the SecureLine Account as the method of payment 
breached Lincoln’s duty of loyalty. ERISA provides that “a 
fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan 
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and 
– (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 
1104(a)(1). ERISA also prohibits a fiduciary from “deal[ing] 
with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own 
account.” Id. § 1106(b)(1). 
 
Lincoln and the amicus present several arguments for 
why payment via a retained asset account advances the 
interests of the beneficiary. For example, they argue some 
beneficiaries are grieving the loss of a close relative, and thus 
not in an ideal position to determine what to do with a large 
lump sum of money. But these arguments miss the mark. The 
issue is not whether the retained asset account is in the 
interest of the beneficiary; rather, the issue is whether 
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Lincoln’s selection of the retained asset account was “solely 
in the interest” of Edmonson and “for the exclusive purpose” 
of providing benefits to her. See id. § 1104(a)(1)(A).  
 
The purpose of establishing the SecureLine Account 
was to pay Edmonson benefits. Lincoln did not directly gain 
any financial benefit from this decision. Nevertheless, 
Edmonson contends this decision was not solely in her 
interest because it put Lincoln in a position where it might 
profit by investing the retained assets. When compared to 
payment via a check, Edmonson asserts, payment via a 
retained asset account was better for Lincoln because it 
created the potential for profit. This increased potential for 
profit, a potential that is wholly dependent on Edmonson’s 
actions, is insufficient to result in a breach of Lincoln’s 
fiduciary duties.  
 
“‘ERISA does not mandate any specific mode of 
payment for . . . benefits.’” Woolsey v. Marion Labs., Inc., 
934 F.2d 1452, 1457 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Oster v. Barco 
of Cal. Emps.’ Ret. Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 
1988)); see Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 
F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Neither [ERISA] nor its 
legislative history comments on the mode or manner in which 
benefits should be paid.”). “[T]he retained-asset account 
method of payment is not in itself necessarily inconsistent 
with ERISA,” Vander Luitgaren v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of 
Canada, No. 09-11410, 2012 WL 5875526, at *11 (D. Mass. 
Nov. 19, 2012), and it “is inconsistent with ERISA’s goals to 
prohibit this type of arrangement.” Merrimon v. Unum Life 
Ins. Co. of Am., 845 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 (D. Me. 2012). 
Accordingly, we conclude Lincoln did not breach its fiduciary 
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duties when it exercised its discretion to pay Edmonson with 
a retained asset account.
14
 
 
Finally, even assuming there was a breach, Edmonson 
is not entitled to relief because the breach did not directly 
cause the injury for which she seeks relief, Lincoln’s 
investment for its own profit. ERISA requires a plaintiff to 
show that the injury was a proximate cause of the breach of 
duty. Willett v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., 953 F.2d 
1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 1992).  Had Lincoln never invested the 
retained assets, or given Edmonson all the profit it earned, she 
would have suffered no injury. Payment via the retained asset 
                                                 
14
 Edmonson also challenged the amount of interest 
ultimately paid to her, but we do not consider this challenge 
to relate to Lincoln’s initial decision to create and set the 
terms for the SecureLine Account. The minimum interest rate 
Lincoln would pay, as set forth in the SecureLine Account’s 
Terms and Conditions, was 1% above the average rate 
published by Bloomberg for interest-bearing checking 
accounts. Edmonson does not argue that this initial decision 
on what minimum interest rate to pay her violated ERISA. 
Rather, Edmonson argues that Lincoln chose not to 
pay her above that minimum rate, thereby profiting from its 
investment of the retained assets. Axiomatically, Lincoln’s 
decision not to pay her a higher interest rate allowed it to 
profit from the investment of the retained assets. Accordingly, 
we do not consider Lincoln’s decision on the interest 
ultimately paid to Edmonson to constitute an independent 
discretionary act. Instead, we treat Lincoln’s decision not to 
pay Edmonson more interest as identical to its decision to 
profit from the investment of the retained assets. 
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account, by itself, caused her no injury. The establishment of 
the account neither guaranteed or commanded that Lincoln 
take the later act of investing the assets for its own profit. 
And, importantly, Edmonson could have prevented Lincoln 
from investing the retained assets by withdrawing them from 
the SecureLine Account.
15
 Accordingly, we conclude 
Edmonson is not entitled to the disgorgement of Lincoln’s 
profit based on its decision to establish the SecureLine 
Account. 
 
B. Investment of the Retained Assets 
Edmonson also argues that Lincoln breached its 
fiduciary duties when it invested the retained assets for its 
own benefit. She contends this act is governed by ERISA 
because it involved the management or administration of a 
plan or, alternatively, the exercise of authority or control over 
                                                 
15
 This conclusion does not conflict with our earlier 
conclusion that the decision to invest the retained assets was 
“fairly traceable” to the establishment of the SecureLine 
Account for purposes of Article III standing. The “fairly 
traceable” requirement for constitutional standing sets a lower 
bar than the showing of causation required on the merits. See 
The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 360-61 (treating constitutional 
causation as akin to but-for causation); Nova Health Sys. v. 
Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 2005) (“As other 
courts have noted, Article III’s causation requirement 
demands ‘something less than the concept of proximate 
cause.’” (quoting Focus on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast 
Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003))). 
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plan assets. She argues Lincoln’s decision to invest the 
retained assets for its own profit violated its duty of loyalty. 
 
1. 
 
As noted, Edmonson contends the investment of the 
retained assets involved the management or administration of 
the plan. Lincoln argues that it was no longer managing or 
administering the plan once it set up the SecureLine Account, 
but rather was in a creditor-debtor relationship with 
Edmonson when it invested the retained assets. See Faber, 
648 F.3d at 105 (holding the insurance company discharged 
its fiduciary duty when it established the retained asset 
account in accordance with the insurance policy). Lincoln 
analogizes its relationship with Edmonson at that time to that 
of a customer and a bank, as the bank will invest a customer’s 
deposited assets for its own profit, and pay interest to the 
customer in an amount less than the profit it earns. 
 
Nothing in the plan or policy provides that Lincoln had 
any duty with respect to managing or administering the plan 
beyond its payment of benefits to Edmonson. Nor has 
Edmonson argued that anything in the plan or policy required 
Lincoln to perform any act of plan management or 
administration once it paid her the benefits. Rather, she 
contends Lincoln failed to “pay” her as required under the 
policy, arguing that the establishment of the SecureLine 
Account did not constitute payment of the benefits. 
 
Edmonson directs our attention to Mogel, in which the 
court stated “when UNUM says that plaintiffs had been paid, 
referring to the sums already deemed to belong to Plaintiffs, it 
obscures reality.” 547 F.3d at 26 (quotation omitted). The 
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court concluded “the euphemistically named ‘Security 
Account,’ accompanied with a checkbook, was no more than 
an IOU which did not transfer the funds to which the 
beneficiaries were entitled out of the plan assets and hence 
UNUM remained a fiduciary with respect to those funds.” Id. 
at 27. Accordingly, the court held UNUM was still subject to 
fiduciary duties even after it set up the retained asset account. 
 
Edmonson contends that, like in Mogel, Lincoln failed 
to fulfill its obligation to “pay” her, and thus was still 
managing or administering the plan when it invested the 
retained assets. But the terms of the policy in Mogel required 
an immediate lump sum payment upon receipt of proof of a 
claim. Because the policy here is silent as to the form of 
payment, Lincoln had discretion as to how to comply with its 
requirements, under its contractual obligations and, as we 
concluded above, under ERISA. Accordingly, Lincoln 
fulfilled its obligation to pay Edmonson when it established 
the SecureLine Account.
16
  
 
Lincoln, relying on Faber, argues that once it satisfied 
its obligation to pay the benefits, it was no longer managing 
or administering the plan. In Faber, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit held  
                                                 
16
 Edmonson cites to several authorities for the proposition 
that debts must be paid in cash or check unless otherwise 
agreed upon, and thus Lincoln violated the plain terms of the 
plan by not paying her with a check. But these cases are 
inapposite. They only hold that forms of payment such as a 
security or a mortgage cannot be used to pay a debt. See, e.g., 
In re WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 600 F.3d 231, 259 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
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MetLife discharged its fiduciary obligations as a 
claims administrator and ceased to be an ERISA 
fiduciary when, in accordance with the Plans, it 
created Plaintiffs’ [retained asset accounts], 
credited them with the amount of benefits due, 
and issued checkbooks enabling Plaintiffs to 
withdraw their proceeds at any time. Thus, 
MetLife was not acting in a fiduciary capacity 
when it invested the funds backing Plaintiffs’ 
[retained asset accounts]. 
 
Faber, 648 F.3d at 104.  The court continued, “[n]othing in 
the [plans], or in the complaint, provides any indication that 
after the [retained asset accounts] were established either 
Plaintiffs or MetLife contemplated an indefinite fiduciary 
relationship.” Id. at 105. “To the extent MetLife remained 
obligated to honor the account holder’s ‘checks’ and pay 
interest at a guaranteed rate, we believe that this arrangement 
constituted a straightforward creditor-debtor relationship 
governed by the Customer Agreements and state law, not 
ERISA.” Id. We agree. 
 
 Nonetheless, Edmonson contends Lincoln’s fiduciary 
duties over management and administration of the plan 
continued after it established the SecureLine Account even if 
Lincoln had fulfilled its obligations to her under the plan. She 
relies largely on the following quote from Varity Corp. v. 
Howe: 
 
There is more to plan (or trust) administration 
than simply complying with the specific duties 
imposed by the plan documents or statutory 
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regime; it also includes the activities that are 
‘ordinary and natural means’ of achieving the 
‘objective’ of the plan. Indeed, the primary 
function of the fiduciary duty is to constrain the 
exercise of discretionary powers which are 
controlled by no other specific duty imposed by 
the trust instrument or the legal regime. If the 
fiduciary duty applied to nothing more than 
activities already controlled by other specific 
legal duties, it would serve no purpose. 
 
516 U.S. at 504 (emphasis omitted) (quoting G. Bogert & G. 
Bogert, Law of Trusts and Trustees § 551, at 41-52). Based 
on this quote, Edmonson contends whether Lincoln was 
acting as a fiduciary when it invested the retained assets 
requires us to go beyond the question of whether Lincoln had 
satisfied its duties under the plan. 
 
 Edmonson takes the Supreme Court’s quotation from 
Varity Corp. out of context. In Varity Corp., the relevant 
issue was whether Varity, who acted as both the employer 
and the benefits plan administrator, was managing or 
administering the plan when it made misrepresentations to the 
employees about the viability of the plan. Id. at 494-95. The 
defendant asserted that because its representations were not 
required by the plan, it acted in its role as employer, and not 
as plan administrator. Id. at 495. The Court rejected this 
argument with the rationale quoted above. Accordingly, the 
Court stated that even if an act is not required by the plan, it 
may implicate fiduciary duties. 
 
 Varity Corp. does not suggest that Lincoln’s fiduciary 
duty to administer the plan continued after it satisfied its 
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contractual duty to pay Edmonson her benefits, nor did it 
implicate a fiduciary’s obligation to manage or administer a 
plan. We find Faber’s rationale persuasive and conclude 
Lincoln had completed its obligations with respect to 
managing or administering the plan once it established the 
SecureLine Account. Accordingly, Lincoln was not managing 
or administering the plan when it invested the retained assets.  
 
2. 
 Edmonson alternatively argues that Lincoln was acting 
as a fiduciary when it invested the retained assets because that 
act involved exercising authority or control over plan assets. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he . . . exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of 
its assets . . . .”). Lincoln contends the retained assets were 
not plan assets. We agree.
17
 
 
“[I]n the absence of specific statutory or regulatory  
guidance,” as here, “the term ‘plan assets’ should be given its 
ordinary meaning, and therefore should be construed to refer 
to property owned by an ERISA plan.” Sec’y of Labor v. 
Doyle, 675 F.3d 187, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Luna, 
406 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005)). “This approach is also 
consistent with guidance provided by the Secretary [of Labor] 
                                                 
17
 Lincoln also argues that it did not have authority or control 
over the retained assets because Edmonson had the ability to 
withdraw the entire balance from her retained asset account at 
any time. Based on our conclusion that the retained assets 
were not plan assets, we do not reach this argument. 
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on the meaning of ‘plan assets,’ which states that ‘the assets 
of a plan generally are to be identified on the basis of 
ordinary notions of property rights under non-ERISA law. In 
general, the assets of a welfare plan would include any 
property, tangible or intangible, in which the plan has a 
beneficial ownership interest.’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Labor, 
Advisory Op. No. 93-14A, 1993 WL 188473, at *4 (May 5, 
1993)).
18
 
 
The Faber court applied this approach and concluded 
the “‘retained assets’ are not ‘plan assets’ because the Plans 
do not have an ownership interest—beneficial or otherwise—
in them.” Faber, 648 F.3d at 106. The court explained that 
once the retained asset accounts were created, the insurance 
company’s “remaining obligations are to honor checks drawn 
on the [retained asset accounts] and to pay interest at the 
stipulated rate.” Id. It concluded that “under ordinary notions 
                                                 
18
 The parties agree the assets held by Lincoln before 
Edmonson submitted her claim were not plan assets, under 
the guaranteed benefit policy exemption of ERISA. This 
provision provides, “[i]n the case of a plan to which a 
guaranteed benefit policy is issued by an insurer, the assets of 
such plan shall be deemed to include such policy, but shall 
not, solely by reason of the issuance of such policy, be 
deemed to include any assets of such insurer.” 29 U.S.C. § 
1101(b)(2). The parties also appear to agree that this 
exemption no longer applied once Lincoln established the 
retained asset account for Edmonson. While the amicus finds 
the guaranteed benefit exemption to be significant, arguing 
that the assets would not “suddenly” turn into plan assets, we, 
like the parties, do not place much emphasis on it. 
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of property rights, this relationship involves MetLife simply 
as a debtor and the beneficiary-turned-account holder simply 
as a creditor—a relationship fundamentally different from an 
ERISA fiduciary relationship with its panoply of 
discretionary authority and responsibility.” Id. 
 
In reaching its conclusion, the Faber court relied in 
part on an amicus brief/opinion letter submitted by the 
Secretary of Labor, in which the Secretary argued, inter alia, 
that the retained assets were not plan assets. The Secretary 
posited that the ordinary notions of property rights determine 
whether an asset is a plan asset, and considered whether 
anything in the plan documents or elsewhere gave the plans 
an ownership interest in the retained assets, noting that 
“whether a particular asset is a ‘plan asset’ requires a factual 
inquiry into the parties’ representations and understandings.” 
Brief of U.S. Dep’t of Labor at 12, Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 648 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011). The Secretary concluded 
there was no evidence the plan had an ownership interest in 
the retained asset, and thus the retained assets were not plan 
assets. The Faber court adopted this conclusion. 
 
Lincoln urges us to pay deference to the Secretary’s 
opinion under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
Under Skidmore, we defer to the Secretary’s opinion letter 
based on “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.” Id. at 140. We see no reason to disagree with the 
Secretary’s legal argument that the ordinary notions of 
property rights determine whether an asset is a plan asset, and 
that we should look to the plan and the plan documents in 
making this determination. Furthermore, Doyle suggests this 
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already is the law in our circuit. See Doyle, 675 F.3d at 203. 
But as the Secretary states, whether specific assets are plan 
assets is ultimately a factual inquiry, so we must turn to the 
specific facts here to make this determination.
19
  
 
Edmonson has not identified anything in the plan or 
policy documents that supports a conclusion the plan retained 
an ownership interest in the retained assets after Lincoln 
established the SecureLine Account. Edmonson argues the 
plan had an ownership interest in the retained assets because 
Lincoln kept the money in its general account until a draft 
was presented for payment, rather than depositing the funds 
in the bank backing the SecureLine Account, and if Lincoln 
failed to pay them over to her, the plan would be liable. But 
Edmonson cites to no authority for this proposition, and does 
not point to any provision in the plan or policy to support it. 
Even if the plan could be compelled to enforce its rights 
against Lincoln, that right is not equivalent to an ownership 
stake in Lincoln’s general account funds. 
 
Edmonson contends we should follow Mogel and 
conclude the retained assets were plan assets because 
payment via a retained asset account failed to satisfy 
Lincoln’s duty to pay her. As discussed, we disagree that 
                                                 
19
 Edmonson urges us to disregard the analysis in the letter 
brief because the recent decision in Christopher v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012), casts doubt on 
paying deference to such briefs. The Christopher opinion, 
however, focused primarily on whether the briefs in that case 
were persuasive, so Edmonson’s argument that Christopher 
generally casts doubt on the legitimacy of amicus briefs from 
the Secretary is unavailing. See id. at 2169-70. 
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Lincoln failed to fulfill its obligation to pay Edmonson. 
Moreover, we do not read Mogel as holding the retained 
assets were plan assets. The Mogel court, after finding the 
insurance company had not discharged its contractual duties 
under the policy to pay a lump sum, concluded “the sums due 
plaintiffs remain plan assets subject to UNUM’s fiduciary 
obligations until actual payment.” Mogel, 547 F.3d at 26. The 
Mogel court, however, did not mention that plan assets are to 
be determined based on the ordinary notions of property 
rights, nor it did consider the definition of plan assets. Rather, 
as the Faber court stated, “Mogel is better understood as 
predicated on the fact, not present here, that the insurer failed 
to abide by plan terms requiring it to distribute benefits in 
lump sums,” and thus was still managing or administering the 
plan. Faber, 648 F.3d at 106-07; see also Merrimon, 845 F. 
Supp. 2d at 318-19 (explaining that Mogel’s “core holding” 
“did not require the First Circuit to find that the sums due to 
those plaintiffs were plan assets,” and opining that “if the 
First Circuit were required to address the issue squarely, it 
would not hold that the funds backing the [retained asset 
accounts] in this case are plan assets”); Vander Luitgaren, 
2012 WL 5875526, at *8 (similarly finding Mogel should not 
be interpreted as holding the retained assets were plan assets). 
Accordingly, Mogel provides little support for Edmonson’s 
argument that the retained assets were plan assets. 
 
Alternatively, Edmonson urges us to apply the 
“functional approach” to determining whether an asset is a 
plan asset, as set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit in Acosta v. Pacific Enterprises, 950 F.2d 611 (9th 
Cir. 1991). Under Acosta, an asset is a plan asset when “the 
item in question may be used to the benefit (financial or 
otherwise) of the fiduciary at the expense of plan participants 
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or beneficiaries.” Id. at 620. We recently stated, albeit in 
dicta, that “this approach may be helpful when considering 
whether items other than cash or financial instruments are 
properly considered assets of an ERISA plan.” Doyle, 675 
F.3d at 203 n.33. In a later footnote in that opinion, we stated 
the “Supreme Court has also strongly suggested that [the 
approach based on ordinary notions of property rights] is the 
proper approach to defining ‘plan assets.’” Id. at 204 n.34 
(citing Jackson v. United States, 555 U.S. 1163 (2009)).
20
  
 
 Doyle suggests that we should not apply the Acosta 
approach, as the assets in question are cash or financial 
instruments. Cf. Acosta, 950 F.2d at 620 (considering whether 
a participant-shareholder list was a plan asset). In any event, 
the assets at issue are not plan assets under Acosta. Although 
Lincoln used the assets for its own benefit, it did not use them 
“at the expense of plan participants or beneficiaries.” Id.  
 
 We conclude the retained assets were not plan assets. 
In short, once Lincoln set up the SecureLine Account, the 
plan no longer had an interest in the assets and, under 
ordinary notions of property rights, Lincoln and Edmonson 
were in a creditor-debtor relationship. Accordingly, Lincoln’s 
conduct was not constrained by ERISA’s duty of loyalty. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                 
20
 In Jackson, the Court vacated the lower court’s decision in 
light of the Solicitor General’s brief, which argued for the 
application of the ordinary notions of property rights 
approach. See Doyle, 675 F.3d at 204 n.34. 
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 We conclude Lincoln did not breach its fiduciary 
duties under ERISA when it chose to pay Edmonson with a 
retained asset account and then invested the retained assets 
for its own profit. The decision to pay Edmonson with the 
retained asset account did not breach Lincoln’s duty of 
loyalty to her. And when Lincoln then invested the retained 
assets, it was not acting in a fiduciary capacity. Accordingly, 
we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
1 
 
Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. 12-1581 (appeal 
from E.D. Pa. Case No. 10-4919, Baylson, J.) 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting. 
I agree with the Majority and the District Court that 
Lincoln should win this case, but I would vacate and remand 
for dismissal of the complaint because Edmonson lacks both 
constitutional and statutory standing, since she abandoned her 
claim for injunctive relief under ERISA and seeks only the 
payment of funds she claims that Lincoln wrongfully 
retained.  I would not reach the issue of the alleged breach of 
Lincoln’s fiduciary duty under ERISA. 
 
“To bring a civil action under ERISA, a plaintiff must 
have constitutional, prudential, and statutory standing.”  
Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne. Pa., 454 F.3d 
120, 125 (3d Cir. 2006).  Constitutional standing, as the 
Majority points out, requires three elements: injury-in-fact, a 
causal connection between that injury and the complained-of 
conduct, and the likelihood that the injury can be redressed by 
court action.  As to the first element, it is well-established that 
“[a]n injury-in-fact must be a palpable and distinct harm 
that[] ... affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way.”  Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The Majority seems to treat a plaintiff demanding 
disgorgement as a special case for purposes of the injury-in-
fact requirement of Article III standing.  It suggests that a 
plaintiff seeking that remedy need not demonstrate an actual 
injury because “[a] requirement of a net financial loss would 
allow fiduciaries to retain ill-gotten profit – exactly what 
disgorgement claims are designed to prevent – so long as the 
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breaches of fiduciary duty do not harm the plan or 
beneficiaries.”  (Majority Op. at 12-13.)  Thus, the Majority 
concludes that “the nature of disgorgement claims suggest[s] 
that a financial loss is not required for standing, as a loss is 
not an element of a disgorgement claim.”  (Id. at 13)1 
 
That conclusion, however, runs counter to our holding 
in Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc., 333 F.3d 450 
(3d Cir. 2003).  In that case, an ERISA plan participant 
alleged that a fiduciary had violated an ERISA requirement 
that a fiduciary disclose “all material facts relating to the 
insurance benefits it provides.”  Id. at 453 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In particular, the plaintiff said that the 
fiduciary had failed to disclose certain physician incentives 
that had the potential to decrease the overall quality of care 
provided.  Id.  Although the plaintiff did not allege that she 
had been personally affected by the existence of the 
incentives or that the care that she received under the plan 
was in any way deficient, she sought both injunctive relief as 
well as restitution or disgorgement of the amount by which 
                                              
1
 The Majority finds support for that conclusion in the 
“principles of ERISA” whose “duty of loyalty bars a fiduciary 
from profiting even if no loss to the plan occurs.”  (Majority 
Op. at 13.)  That approach conflates constitutional and 
statutory standing in a manner that is particularly inapt in this 
case.  Although “[t]he actual or threatened injury required by 
Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal 
rights, the invasion of which creates standing,” that is only 
true “with regard to injunctive relief.”   Horvath v. Keystone 
Health Plan East, Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  But that is 
not the relief that Edmonson is seeking. 
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she and other members of the putative class had supposedly 
overpaid as a result of the fiduciary’s failure to make the 
required disclosures.  We decided that a plaintiff claiming a 
fiduciary breach under ERISA “need not demonstrate actual 
harm in order to have standing to seek injunctive relief” to 
require a fiduciary to comply with ERISA, but that “requests 
for restitution and disgorgement, both of which are individual 
in nature[,] ... require her to demonstrate individual loss.” Id. 
at 456. 
 
It is true, as the Majority insists, that Horvath is 
different from the present case.  The plaintiff’s claim there 
was “premised on her argument that her firm overpaid for the 
healthcare she received,” id., and there was no other evidence 
of individual harm.  In this case, by contrast, as the District 
Court observed, “Plaintiff alleged that she suffered an 
individual loss, measured as the ‘spread’ or difference 
between the interest that Defendant allegedly earned on the 
benefits in Plaintiff’s SecureLine account, and the interest 
that Defendant paid to Plaintiff.”  Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l 
Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
2
   
                                              
2
 The  District Court concluded that that was “a 
sufficient allegation of injury in fact, caused by defendant’s 
conduct” to establish Article III standing.  Edmonson v. 
Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 869, 881 (E.D. 
Pa. 2011).  The Court, however, considered standing only in 
response to Lincoln’s motion to dismiss.  The Court declined 
to follow a case cited by Lincoln in support of its argument 
that Edmonson lacked standing because, in the Court’s view, 
it “imposed too high a burden on a plaintiff with respect to 
the jurisdictional allegations on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion,” id., 
but the Court did not revisit the issue at the summary 
4 
 
 
But in an important and dispositive respect the cases 
are the same: just as the plaintiff in Horvath “concede[d] that 
the care and coverage she received as a member of [her 
employer’s] HMO was never affected by the existence of 
physician incentives,” 333 F.3d at 456, Edmonson effectively 
concedes that she received everything to which she was 
entitled under her husband’s employer’s plan.  See 
Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (noting that Edmonson 
agreed at oral argument that she had received both her 
“claimed benefit, in the amount of $10,000.00[,] plus $138.08 
interest” by check shortly after she decided to close her 
SecureLine Account).  Moreover, Edmonson has adduced no 
evidence that, if she had been paid in a lump sum rather than 
through a retained asset account, she would have invested her 
death benefit and generated the same profit or “spread” that 
she now seeks to reclaim from Lincoln.  She has merely 
hypothesized a greater benefit, had Lincoln administered the 
plan in a different way than it did.  That ought not be enough.  
See Kendall v. Emps. Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 
119 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that an ERISA plan participant’s 
lost opportunity to receive higher benefits did not constitute 
an injury-in-fact); Drutis v. Rand McNally & Co., 499 F.3d 
608, 611 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiffs who claimed 
damage based on “what they would have received if the[ir] 
[employer’s] plan were re-formed to meet the requirements of 
ERISA” failed to allege an injury-in-fact).  Thus, although 
Edmonson may have attempted to individualize her claim by 
basing it on the lost spread, her injury remains “entirely 
speculative” and “hypothetical at best,” and she accordingly 
                                                                                                     
judgment stage, even though Edmonson had provided no 
further evidence of an injury-in-fact. 
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lacks the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” 
which is “an injury in fact that is … actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”  Drutis, 499 F.3d at 611 (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
3
  
 
The Majority correctly observes that “[o]ur decision in 
Horvath did not revolve around whether the plaintiff suffered 
a financial loss.”  (Majority Op. at 15.)  It did, however, turn 
on the question of whether the plaintiff had demonstrated an 
individual loss, i.e., an actual injury to that particular plaintiff.  
That showing is required when a plaintiff is seeking 
individual relief under ERISA.  See In re Unisys Sav. Plan 
Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 159 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
plaintiff seeking individual relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), in 
                                              
3
 That is also the conclusion that the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York reached 
in Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 10588(HB), 2009 WL 
3415369 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2009), aff’d, 648 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 
2011), on identical facts.  See id. at *5 (noting that “this pool 
of funds to which [Plaintiffs] claim entitlement is not 
‘identifiable and quantifiable;’ rather, to identify and quantify 
any measure of relief for the Plaintiffs would require an 
accounting to determine what amount of funds allegedly 
should be reclaimed by the Plaintiffs and the putative class”); 
id. (noting that “Plaintiffs do not – and cannot – deny that 
they have received the full amount of benefits to which they 
were entitled”).  Edmonson’s claim for disgorgement is 
similarly based not on a particular amount of interest due to 
her, but rather on an unidentified amount of investment profit 
that Lincoln allegedly earned while her SecureLine assets 
were in its possession.   
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contrast to §502(a)(2), which allows relief on behalf of a plan, 
is required to prove an individual loss).  Yet the Majority 
appears to conclude, as one other court has, that Horvath 
requires only that an ERISA plaintiff demonstrate that she, 
rather than the plan, was “personally affected by the alleged 
breach.”  Central States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare 
Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 
200 (2d Cir. 2005) (interpreting Horvath’s “individual loss” 
requirement).  That unduly lax formulation effectively 
eliminates the injury-in-fact requirement, as virtually any 
breach of fiduciary duty to a plan can be said to “personally 
affect” a plan participant through its impact on the plan itself.   
 
The Majority believes the meaning of Horvath to be 
that either “a plan has the right to the profit, [and] the 
individual plaintiff has not suffered a constitutional injury,” 
or else the plaintiff “has an individual right to the defendant’s 
profit” and she has suffered an injury-in-fact.  (Majority Op. 
at 16-17.)  That, however, presupposes that there are only two 
possibilities when a breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty is 
alleged.  There is, however, a third possibility: that neither the 
plan nor the individual is entitled to the defendant’s profit.  
That would be the case when a plan permitted the fiduciary to 
retain and invest funds pending the payment of a benefit, and 
the plaintiff received the fixed amount to which she was 
entitled, as is argued to be the case here.  And in such a case, 
neither the plan nor the individual can rightly allege an 
injury-in-fact based on not having received something to 
which neither was entitled, regardless of whether the 
defendant breached its fiduciary duty.
4
   
                                              
4
 As discussed infra, the remedy for a fiduciary breach 
in such circumstances is not damages, but rather an injunction 
7 
 
 
In other words, any right to the profit generated with 
plan assets, the loss of which is now said to be an injury-in-
fact, does not automatically follow from the alleged breach, at 
least not in a defined benefit plan of the type at issue here.  
Cf. Harley v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 905-06 
(8th Cir. 2002) (discussing the “proper focus” of the standing 
inquiry in an action “to seek relief …for [a] particular breach 
of duty, given the unique features of a defined benefit plan”).  
As the term implies, a defined benefit plan entitles a 
participant to no more than her benefit as defined.  “[T]he 
employee, upon retirement, is entitled to a fixed periodic 
payment.”  Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 
439 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
As a result, “the employer typically bears the entire 
investment risk and ... must cover any underfunding as the 
result of a shortfall that may occur from the plan’s 
investments.”  Id.  But, “[s]ince a decline in the value of a 
plan’s assets does not alter accrued benefits, members 
similarly have no entitlement to share in a plan’s surplus ... .”  
Id. at 440.     
 
In this case, the defined amount to which Edmonson 
was entitled was her $10,000 death benefit – a fixed 
entitlement that remained in place after her SecureLine 
Account was established, even if Lincoln had lost money 
investing the funds backing that account.  Having no claim on 
the profits, she cannot claim an individual loss – or even that 
she was “personally affected” – by not receiving a share of 
those profits.  And “the limits on judicial power imposed by 
                                                                                                     
or “other appropriate equitable relief,” i.e., the remedy 
provided under ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
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Article III counsel against permitting participants or 
beneficiaries who have suffered no injury in fact from suing 
to enforce ERISA fiduciary duties on behalf of the Plan.”  
Harley, 284 F.3d at 906. 
 
Notwithstanding the requirements of Article III, and 
worried that imposing a loss requirement would mean that 
fiduciaries could “retain ill-gotten profit … so long as the 
breaches of fiduciary duty do not harm the plan or 
beneficiaries” (Majority Op. at 13), the Majority treats an 
action for disgorgement as sui generis.  The Majority says 
that an ERISA plaintiff seeking disgorgement of profits to 
which she claims entitlement need only plead that there has 
been a breach and that the plan itself is not entitled to recover.  
But our decision in Horvath states quite plainly that a 
fiduciary duty breach is sufficient to confer standing on an 
ERISA plaintiff only “with regard to injunctive relief.”  333 
F.3d at 456.  That is not the relief that Edmonson is seeking, 
so, per our own binding precedent, she does not have 
constitutional standing to press her claim.
5
    
                                              
5
 Relying on our reasoning in Horvath, the Second 
Circuit has come to the same standing conclusion in two 
cases closely resembling this one.  First, in Kendall v. 
Employees Retirement Plan of Avon Products, 561 F.3d 112 
(2d Cir. 2009), an ERISA plan participant took issue with a 
provision that partially offset social security payments against 
plan benefits based on a formula that penalized certain 
retirees.  The plaintiff claimed injury on the grounds that “the 
Offset under the Plan prevents her from realizing higher 
benefits,” id. at 119, and argued that her employer could 
either adjust the formula to spread it more evenly or eliminate 
the offset altogether, id. at 119 n.14.  The Court observed that 
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the plaintiff “concedes that her future benefits under a 
modified Plan that conforms to ERISA are not yet 
determined” and held that her “claim, that she would receive 
more in benefits were the Offset to be eliminated or the Plan 
modified to conform to ERISA, is not an injury-in-fact.”  Id. 
at 122.  The Court also noted that “the best [plaintiff] offers 
the court is a calculation of how a hypothetical Plan 
participant would be injured” by the offset provision of the 
plan.  Id.  Edmonson has not even provided such a 
hypothetical calculation of her lost “spread.” 
Second, in Faber v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 
648 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011), as in this case, an ERISA plan 
beneficiary complained that her benefit had been paid in the 
form of a retained asset account rather than in a lump sum.  
The Court noted that “[i]n the ERISA context, we have drawn 
a distinction between constitutional standing to seek 
injunctive relief and constitutional standing to seek 
disgorgement.”  Id. at 102.  The Court concluded that 
“[plaintiff] need not demonstrate actual harm in order to have 
standing to seek injunctive relief requiring that [defendant] 
satisfy its statutorily-created … fiduciary responsibilities,” 
but that “[o]btaining restitution or disgorgement under ERISA 
requires that a plaintiff satisfy the strictures of constitutional 
standing by demonstrating individual loss; to wit, that they 
have suffered an injury-in-fact.”  Id. (alterations and emphasis 
in original) (quoting and citing Horvath, 333 F.3d at 456-57) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The only reason that the 
Faber Court did not dismiss the action based on standing was 
that that plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief against the 
insurer as well.  See id. at 103 (agreeing with the district court 
“insofar as it concluded that Faber has constitutional standing 
10 
 
In addition to constitutional standing,“[t]o bring a civil 
action under ERISA, a plaintiff must have … statutory 
standing.”  Leuthner, 454 F.3d at 125.  The inquiry into 
statutory standing requires a court to determine “whether 
Congress has accorded this injured plaintiff the right to sue 
the defendant to redress [her] injury.”  Graden v. Conexant 
Sys. Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in 
original).  Under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B), “[a] civil action may 
be brought … by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary … to 
obtain ... appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter 
or the terms of the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).6  Thus, 
“the statute authorizes appropriate equitable relief[,] [and] 
[w]e should expect that courts, in fashioning appropriate 
equitable relief, will keep in mind the special nature and 
purpose of employee benefit plans, and will respect the policy 
                                                                                                     
to seek injunctive relief”).  Again, that is not the relief that 
Edmonson seeks in this case. 
6
  In its analysis of statutory standing, the District 
Court focused only on whether Edmonson was a 
“beneficiary” within the meaning of ERISA § 502(a)(3) when 
she commenced this lawsuit, given that her claim had already 
been paid in full.  The Court concluded that she was, because 
“plaintiff’s status [is] measured at the time the breach of 
fiduciary duty occurred, rather than the time of the appeal.”  
Edmonson, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 882 (citing Daniels v. Thomas 
& Betts Corp., 263 F.3d 66, 78 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The Court 
did not consider whether she lacks statutory standing based 
on the relief that she seeks.   
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choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the 
exclusion of others.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 
(1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also id. at 497 (noting Congress’s “desire not to 
create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or 
litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from 
offering welfare benefit plans in the first place”). 
 
The statutory standing problem for Edmonson is that, 
as we said in Horvath, “claims for restitution and 
disgorgement [under ERISA 502(a)(3)] are likely barred by 
the Supreme Court’s ... decision in Great-West [Life & 
Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)].”  
Horvath, 333 F.3d at 457 n.3.  In Great-West Life, the Court 
pointed out that ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides only equitable 
relief, see 534 U.S. at 209-10, and then said that whether 
relief for an ERISA fiduciary breach is cognizable as 
equitable relief under that section “depends on the basis for 
[the plaintiff’s] claim and the nature of the underlying 
remedies sought,” id. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont’l Cas. 
Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The Court noted that “[a]lmost invariably ... 
suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or 
declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money 
to the plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase 
has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than 
compensation for a loss resulting from the defendant’s breach 
of legal duty.”  Id. at 210 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  It concluded that, “[i]n cases in which the 
plaintiff could not assert title or right to possession of 
particular property, but in which nevertheless he might be 
able to show just grounds for recovering money to pay for 
12 
 
some benefit the defendant had received from him, the 
plaintiff had a right to restitution at law … .”  Id. at 213 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  By contrast, “for 
restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must seek not 
to impose personal liability on the defendant, but to restore to 
the plaintiff particular funds or property in the defendant’s 
possession.”  Id. at 214. 
 
The “disgorgement” Edmonson seeks is nothing more 
than compensation for an alleged loss allegedly caused by an 
alleged breach of Lincoln’s fiduciary duty.  In other words, it 
is precisely the type of relief that Great-West Life said was 
legal, not equitable.  The Majority’s discussion of 
disgorgement in support of its conclusion that Edmonson has 
constitutional standing makes that clear.  The Majority says 
that the purpose of an action seeking disgorgement, at least in 
the ERISA context, is “to deter the fiduciary from engaging in 
disloyal conduct by denying him the profits of his breach” 
(Majority Op. at 13), and that the fiduciary “is liable for any 
profits he has made through his breach of trust,” (id. at 14 n.5 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  If that is the case, then it 
is difficult to see how Edmonson’s claim for “disgorgement” 
is anything other than an attempt to “impose personal liability 
on the defendant,” Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at  214, for “the 
defendant’s breach of legal duty,” id. at 210.  That certainly 
has all the marks of legal relief that is unavailable under 
§ 502(a)(3).  See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 
255 (1993) (“Although they often dance around the word, 
what petitioners seek is nothing other than compensatory 
damages – monetary relief for all losses [they] sustained as a 
result of the alleged breach of fiduciary duties.  Money 
damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.” 
(emphasis in original)).   
13 
 
Perhaps in an effort the avoid that problem, the 
Majority recasts disgorgement as an “accounting for profits” 
for purposes of statutory standing, so that it falls within an 
exception to Great-West Life’s bar on § 502(a)(3) actions that 
seek to impose personal liability on a defendant.  See Great-
West Life, 534 U.S. at 214 n.2 (recognizing a “limited 
exception for an accounting for profits, a form of equitable 
restitution”).7  There are two problems with that rhetorical 
shift.  First, an accounting is only proper when “a plaintiff is 
entitled to a constructive trust on particular property held by 
the defendant, [so that] he may also recover profits produced 
by the defendant’s use of that property.”  Id.; see also Unisys 
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig. v. Unisys Corp., 
579 F.3d 200, 238 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he question here is not 
whether disgorgement of profits or accounting for profits is 
an equitable remedy, but rather whether the plaintiffs have 
demonstrated that their claims for relief meet the 
requirements for applying this type of remedy.”).8  
                                              
7
 We recognized an equitable restitution claim under 
ERISA in Plucinski v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund, 875 
F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1989), holding that “there is an equitable 
cause of action by employers for the recovery of contributions 
erroneously paid to pension funds due to a mistake of fact or 
law.” Id. at 1057.  However, we characterized restitution as 
an equitable remedy only to the extent that the plan sponsor 
had made an “honest mistake” and limited its recovery to the 
specific amount erroneously paid into the pension fund.  Id. at 
1058.  But we held that equitable restitution does not include 
an award of interest on that amount for the time it was held by 
the fund.  Id. at 1058 n.6.  That is, in essence, the remedy that 
Edmonson seeks in this case.   
8
  The Supreme Court explicitly characterized an 
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Entitlement to a constructive trust in turn, requires that “the 
defendant (i) has been unjustly enriched (ii) by acquiring 
legal title to specifically identifiable property (iii) at the 
expense of the claimant or in violation of the claimant’s rights 
... .”  Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment § 55 cmt. a (2011).  Thus, a “[c]onstructive trust 
is the principal device for vindicating equitable ownership 
against conflicting legal title ... .”  Id.  This case presents 
exactly the opposite situation.  Here, legal title passed to 
Edmonson when Lincoln established her SecureLine 
Account.  Lincoln had no legal title to the funds, nor was 
Edmonson left with a mere equitable claim, during the period 
for which she contends that she is entitled to the excess 
spread.  So this case does not present the circumstances in 
which a plaintiff would be entitled to the remedy of a 
constructive trust or an accounting for the profits on that trust.  
See Unisys, 579 F.3d at 238 (concluding that plaintiffs could 
not recover under § 502(a)(3) where the requirements for an 
accounting for profits were not met).
9
  
                                                                                                     
accounting for profits, requiring entitlement to a constructive 
trust, as a “limited exception” to what it concluded was 
ERISA’s bar on standing to seek certain types of 
restitutionary relief.  Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 214 n.2.  I 
therefore fail to see how Edmonson’s ability to assert a 
constructive trust over the assets securing her SecureLine 
Account “goes to the merits of her claim, not statutory 
standing,” as the Majority contends.  (Majority Op. at 22 
n.11.)  
9
 The Majority cites Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours, 372 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2004) for the proposition that 
“[t]he disgorgement remedy is equitable even though Lincoln 
no longer ha[d] possession of the retained assets, making a 
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Second, according to § 51(4) of the Restatement of 
Restitution, the purpose of the restitutionary remedy of an 
accounting is to “eliminate profit from wrongdoing while 
avoiding, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.”  
Thus, “[t]he profit for which the wrongdoer is liable by the 
rule of § 51(4) is the net increase in assets of the wrongdoer, 
to the extent that this increase is attributable to the underlying 
wrong.”  Id. § 51 cmt. e.  In this case, the profit that Lincoln 
may (or may not) have generated is attributable to 
Edmonson’s decision not to withdraw the funds from her 
SecureLine Account when she could have.  The Majority 
itself acknowledges that.  (See Majority Op. at 30 (“This 
increased potential for profit[] ... is wholly dependent on 
Edmonson’s actions ... .”).)  There is thus no basis for an 
accounting for profits, and the limited exception that the 
Great-West Life Court recognized to its general rule that 
compensation for breach of a legal duty is unavailable under 
ERISA § 502(a)(3) does not apply to Edmonson’s claim. 
                                                                                                     
claim for a constructive trust unnecessary.”  (Majority Op. at 
22.)  In that case, we held that a beneficiary had an equitable 
claim for interest during the period that payment of a benefit 
was delayed, see Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 209, the contrary 
conclusion that we reached in Plucinski, see supra note 7.  
But that equitable claim was limited to the period during 
which the plan wrongly retained legal title to the funds, i.e., a 
period during which the requirements of a constructive trust 
were satisfied.  See Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 209 (analogizing 
the claimed interest to “prejudgment interest” on a claim that 
had already been adjudicated).  Thus, we did not hold in 
Skretvedt that disgorgement is an equitable remedy where the 
defendant no longer had legal title to the beneficiary’s funds, 
as in this case.  
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 As the Supreme Court has explained, in the context of 
claims arising under ERISA § 502(a)(3), “[e]quitable relief 
must mean something less than all relief.”  Mertens, 508 U.S. 
at 258 & n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Respecting 
Congress’s choice to limit the relief available under 
§ 502(a)(3) to ‘equitable relief’ requires us to recognize the 
difference between legal and equitable forms of restitution.  
[When] petitioners seek only the former, their suit is not 
authorized by § 502(a)(3).”  Great-West Life, 534 U.S. at 218.  
Because what Edmonson seeks under the label of 
“disgorgement” is in reality a claim for damages and is the 
only relief she seeks, she lacks both statutory standing and 
constitutional standing. 
 
With all respect to my colleagues in the Majority, I 
would vacate the summary judgment for Lincoln and remand 
to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint, based on Edmonson’s lack of standing.10   
                                              
10
 Although I would not reach the merits of 
Edmonson’s appeal, it strikes me that the Majority’s merits 
decision is at odds with its conclusions as to her constitutional 
and statutory standing.   Constitutional standing requires, in 
addition to an injury-in-fact, “a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be 
fairly … trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not … th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party ... .”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992) (alterations in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Majority concludes that 
Lincoln’s ability to generate a profit using the funds backing 
her SecureLine Account was “wholly dependent on 
Edmonson’s actions,” i.e., her decision not to withdraw all of 
17 
 
                                                                                                     
her funds as soon as the account was established, and that that 
“is insufficient to result in a breach of Lincoln’s fiduciary 
duties.”  (Majority Op. at 30.)  That suggests that Edmonson’s 
claimed injury was “fairly traceable” to her own inaction, 
rather than to Lincoln’s payment of her death benefit using a 
SecureLine Account, and that she has failed to plead 
causation for purposes of Article III standing.    
Similarly, in order to claim statutory standing based on 
Great-West Life’s exception for an accounting for profits, 
Edmonson must demonstrate that those profits are 
“attributable to the underlying wrong.”  Restatement of 
Restitution § 51 cmt. e.  Because the majority concludes that 
Lincoln has not breached its fiduciary duty, there is no 
“underlying wrong” that can be the subject of a restitutionary 
remedy.  That further undercuts the Majority’s conclusion 
that her claim for disgorgement is really an equitable claim 
for an accounting, and suggests that she lacks standing under 
ERISA § 502(a)(3). 
